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PEACE OR JUSTICE: NOW THAT PEACE IS BEING NEGOTIATED IN
UGANDA, WILL THE ICC STILL PURSUE JUSTICE?
Kimberly Hanlon*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Ugandan government has spent the last twenty years in conflict with
the Lord's Resistance Army ("LRA"), led by rebel leader Joseph Kony. 1 The
LRA is notorious for the atrocities they perpetrated against their own people,
particularly the Acholi tribe in Northern Uganda. The Ugandan government
and the LRA entered into a ceasefire agreement on August 26, 2006,3 and
renewed the extended agreement with a second ceasefire truce on November 1,
2006.4  Negotiations for a permanent peace agreement have been promising,
despite open hostilities at times between the parties.5 Complicating the situation
are the current International Criminal Court ("ICC") indictments for Joseph
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1. Daniel Kalinaki, Kony Comes in from the Cold, E. AFR., Sept. 5, 2006.
2. Id.
3. Frank Nyakairu, LRA, Govt Sign New Ceasefire Agreement, DAILY MONITOR (Uganda),
Nov. 2, 2006.
4. Id.
5. See id.
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Kony and his top rebel leaders.6 Uganda recommended the matter to the ICC in
December, 2003, 7 while also promising amnesty for the leaders if they disarm
and return home. 8 The Ugandan government is recommending a "traditional
reconciliation ceremony called, 'mato oput' - drinking the bitter herb" in lieu of
criminal prosecution.
9
Meanwhile, the ICC has been steadfast in its commitment to prosecute the
LRA, and has much at stake with the LRA being its first referral. Uganda is
promising protection to the LRA, but is also bound by the obligations of its
membership in the ICC. 11 If Uganda refuses to cooperate with the ICC once the
conflict is resolved, the ICC may lose the credibility it has gained to date.
12
Although the current peace negotiations are promising, Yoweri Museveni, the
President of Uganda, and the ICC are both unwilling to drop the indictments
since hostilities could resume, especially likely given that attempts at peace
negotiation between the LRA and Uganda have failed in the past.' 3 Nonetheless,
Kony and his followers have indicated that they will not surrender while the risk
of prosecution remains.
14
Since 1990, aVProximately "[fifty] percent of civil wars have [ended] in
peace agreements." This is a dramatic shift from pre-1990, where in the past
two hundred years only twenty percent of civil wars ended in peace
6. Opiyo Oloya, Careless Talk Rubs Salt in the Wound, NEW VISION (Uganda), Oct. 3, 2006,
available at http://www.newvision.co.ug/PA/8/20/524630.
7. H. Abigail Moy, The International Criminal Court's Arrest Warrants and Uganda's Lord's
Resistance Army: Renewing the Debate Over Amnesty and Complementarity, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS.
J. 267, 269 (2006).
8. Andrew England, Peace Struggles with Justice as Uganda Tries to End Insurgency, FIN.
TIMES, Aug. 30, 2006, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/39b7Ocda-37c3-1ldb-bcOl-
0000779e2340.html.
9. Tristan McConnell, Uganda Sees Local Justice as Key to Peace, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Sept. 8, 2006, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0908/p06s01-woaf.html (explaining
that according to the "mato oput" ceremony, "the perpetrator of a crime meets the victim, admits
wrongdoing, asks for forgiveness, and pays compensation. The ritual ends with perpetrator and
victim sharing a cup of sheep's blood mixed with a bitter root.").
10. Rodney Muhumuza & Emmanuel Gyezaho, No Deal on Arrest Warrants, ICC Tells Kony,
DAILY MONITOR (Uganda), Sept. 7, 2006.
11. Coming in from the Jungle, Maybe, ECONOMIST, Sept. 7, 2006, at 50, available at
http://www.economist.com/world/africa/displaystory.cfm?storyid=7887792.
12. Payam Akhavan, The Lord's Resistance Army Case: Uganda's Submission of the First
State Referral to the International Criminal Court, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 403, 405 (2005).
13. Henry Mukasa, Rugunda Explains Government Line on ICC, NEW VISION (Uganda), Oct.
11, 2006, available at http://www.newvision.co.ug/PA/8/12/526157.
14. Id.
15. Christine Bell, Peace Agreements: Their Nature and Legal Status, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 373,
373 (2006).
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settlements. 16 However, almost half of the post-1990 "peace agreements break
down within five years, and more within a ten-year period ..... 17 Some of
those agreements stay in an ambiguous state that cannot be characterized as
either peace or war. 18 Given the tenuous prospect for peace, it is no wonder that
many nations stand in support of the ICC and the LRA indictments, whichS • 19
represent justice from the Western viewpoint. Contrast to Uganda's offer for
amnesty and push for peace, disregarding the Western principle for justice.
20
The question comes down to state sovereignty versus international21
governance. International law was once limited to interstate affairs, but with
the growing concerns for human rights law and international criminal law,
international law has begun to breach the bounds of domestic law by influencing,
if not attempting to regulate, how nations treat their own citizens. Naturally,
states choose whether to participate in the international legal system through
agreements and treaties, like the treaty establishing the International Criminal
Court.23 When a nation chooses to be bound by the rules of international law,
those rules start to shape and influence domestic law and politics. 24 International
law can help a nation meet its aspirations for economic, social, and cultural
development.25 Nonetheless, handing control over to an international tribunal
has little political favor with governments and gives an incentive to act locally.
26
From a Western viewpoint the story of the LRA is almost unbelievable.
Especially when one hears that the people victimized by these rebels are
advocating forgiveness. However, seen with the African cultural background in
mind, it is not outlandish. Tragic, yes. Bizarre, no.
For a Westerner, it seems unlikely that a man claiming mystical powers
could command a rebellion based on that claim alone. However, that is exactly
what has happened with Joseph Kony in Uganda.27 Given the depth of the
16. Id. at 375.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See Jamie Smyth, Ministers Say Ugandan Suspects Must Be Tried, IRISH TIMES, Sept. 4,
2006; see also Paul Redfem, UK Defends its Stand Over ICC's Arrest Warrant for Kony, E. AFR.,
Sept. 5, 2006.
20. McConnell, supra note 9.
21. See Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, The Future of International Law is
Domestic (or, the European Way of Law), 47 HARV. INT'L L.J. 327 (2006).
22. Id.
23. See id. at 328.
24. See id. at 328-29.
25. See id. at 331.
26. See id. at 341.
27. Exile an Option for Kony, NEW VISION (Uganda), Oct. 14, 2006,
http://www.newvision.co.ug/PA/120/557/526665.
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African belief in the supernatural,28 it is easy to understand how Kony has held
power for 20 years under a cloak of mysticism.
• • • • 29
For a Westerner, it is difficult to accept Joseph Kony's sixty wives. 2 But
from the vantage of an African polygamous marriage tradition,3 0 it is easy to
understand. However, what is incomprehensible to the African viewpoint is the
kidnapping of children to be "wives" against their will31 and the flouting of the
bridewealth.
32
For a Westerner, forgiveness in lieu of justice sounds like impunity. For an
African steeped in traditional justice,33 what is surprising is that Museveni
petitioned the ICC for the LRA situation,34 especially considering the African
opinion of Western jurisprudence. 35
For a Westerner, it is incomprehensible for the Acholi tribal chiefs to ask
victims to forgive their rapists, captors, torturers, and murderers and
. . .. . 36
subsequently welcome them back into civilization. But, given the power and
influence of clans in African society,37 how can clan members say no to their
elders?
The local culture of Uganda, wanting peace above all else, is at odds with
the Western world, wanting justice as it is known in Western jurisprudence. 38
Also in opposition is the interest of the ICC in establishing itself as a legitimate
39body, and Uganda's interest in maintaining autonomy as it develops as a
democracy and asserts its identity since colonialism.40 This comment explores
28. See Daniel Etounga-Manguelle, Does Africa Need a Cultural Adjustment Program?, in
CULTURE MATTERS: How VALUES SHAPE HUMAN PROGRESS 65, 73 (Lawrence E. Harrison &
Samuel P Huntington eds., 2000).
29. Akhavan, supra note 12, at 408.
30. James H. Vaughan, Social and Political Organization in Traditional Societies, in AFRICA
169, 170 (Phyllis M. Martin and Patrick O'Meara eds., 1977).
31. Akhavan, supra note 12, at 408.
32. Vaughan, supra note 30, at 170. See infra notes 191-98 (for an explanation of the concept
of bridewealth).
33. Abraham McLaughlin, Africa After War: Paths to Forgiveness - Ugandans Welcome
'Terrorists' Back, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 23, 2006, available at
http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/1023/p01 s03-woaf.html.
34. Moy, supra note 7, at 269.
35. See McLaughlin, supra note 33.
36. Richard Todwong, MP Otto, Do Your Duty to Our People, DAILY MONITOR (Uganda), Oct.
5, 2006.
37. Vaughan, supra note 30, at 175-76.
38. Barbara Among, Justice Can Wait, We Want Peace First, E. AFR., Sept. 26, 2006; see also
Muhumuza, supra note 10.
39. ICC Says Uganda Crimes May Go on Without Arrests, REUTERS, Sept. 26, 2006, available
at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/EVOD-6TZHZS.
40. BASIL DAVIDSON, THE SEARCH FOR AFRICA: HISTORY, CULTURE, POLITICS 281 (1994).
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these competing notions as they converge in the Ugandan conflict with the LRA.
Part II provides an overview of the history of the conflict and a look at the
current state of the crisis. Part III explores the background context for African
history and culture in which the LRA conflict can be more easily understood. It
describes the political and social rifts in Uganda since the end of colonialism,
and African cultural norms such as clan and family structure, religion and
mysticism, and traditional justice. Part IV examines the International Criminal
Court and its stake in the conflict. That section discusses whether the ICC can
maintain legitimacy without Uganda's cooperation since the conflict is the first
referral to the ICC, there is significant foreign support for ICC prosecution of
Joseph Kony, and other perpetrators of egregious crimes may insist on similar
treatment if the LRA leadership is not prosecuted. Part V looks at Uganda's
obligations to the ICC under the Rome Statute and explores whether Uganda has
made a promise of amnesty to the LRA that it cannot keep. That section
discusses the membership obligations of ICC members and whether Uganda is in
breach of its obligation or is acting under its state sovereignty. Part V also looks
at Uganda's obligation to the world community in forwarding the interests of
justice. In addition, that section explores whether peace is sustainable under
negotiated forgiveness and whether forgiveness is equivalent to justice from the
victims' perspective. Part V finishes the comment with the pros and cons to
amnesty versus prosecution and concludes that the ICC will continue to seek
prosecution of Kony and the LRA leadership.
II. HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT
A. Chronicle of Events Leading Up to the Negotiations
Yoweri Museveni seized power in Uganda in 1986, marking a shift in
power from the Northern Acholi to the Southern Bantu people. 4 1 This event
sparked a series of rebel movements in opposition to Museveni's government.
42
Even before Museveni seized power, there was an economic divide between
North and South in Uganda. 43 Under British colonial rule, Southern Uganda was
designated as revenue-generating cropland, while Northern Uganda was
designated as a labor reserve.44 Postcolonial Ugandan governments maintained
the status quo, furthering the divide between North and South.45 Southern tribal
41. Manisuli Ssenyonjo, Accountability of Non-State Actors in Uganda for War Crimes and
Human Rights Violations: Between Amnesty and the International Criminal Court, 10 J. CONFLICT
& SECURITY L. 405, 409 (2005).
42. Moy, supra note 7, at 267.
43. Ssenyonjo, supra note 41, at 408.
44. Id. at 409.
45. Id.
20071
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members were awarded university and office jobs, while Northern tribal
members were relegated to working in the fields. 46
After Museveni came to power following a five year guerrilla war fought
by his National Resistance Army (NRA), he promptly declared Uganda a single-
party democracy. 47 This eliminated opposing political groups. 48 Several rebel
groups sprang up in Northern Uganda, primarily made of members of the former
Ugandan army, including the Uganda Peoples Defense Army, the Holy Spirit
Movement I and II, and the Uganda Peoples Army.49 The Lord's Resistance
Army (LRA), led by Joseph Kony, rose out of the broken remains of the other
groups. "Kony proclaimed himself a messianic prophet and [claimed that he
intended to rule] Uganda according to the Biblical Ten Commandments." 5
1
Since the Ugandan government supported the Sudanese Liberation Army, the
Sudanese government supported the LRA, providing them with bases and
supplies to continue fighting the Ugandan government.
5
From the start of the conflict, the Ugandan government portrayed Kony as a
"murderous rebel." 53  He called himself a liberator of the people, while
terrorizing the very people he was liberating. 54 Kony and the LRA did not
express a coherent ideology. 55 Their attacks were aimed at gaining food and
supplies rather than gaining territory or making a political statement. 56 Kony
enshrouded himself with mysticism, claiming supernatural powers and
communication with spirits.57 LRA fighters believe he is superhuman and under
the guidance of the Holy Spirit, so they fear defying him. Media coverage
about Kony and the LRA emphasized Kony's mysticism and religious views
rather than any underlying message. 59 In a radio broadcast of a phone interview
46. Jeffrey Gettleman, Uganda Peace Hinges on Amnesty for Brutality, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15,
2006, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/1 5/world/africa/15uganda.html?ex=l 315972800&en=l a51828c
80dade52&ei=5088&partner=r.
47. Ssenyonjo, supra note 41, at 409-10.
48. Id. at 410.
49. Kasaijia Phillip Apuuli, The ICC Arrest Warrants for the Lord's Resistance Army Leaders
and Peace Prospects for Northern Uganda, 4 J. INT'L. CRIM. JUST. 179, 181 (2006).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 182.
52. Id.
53. Kalinaki, supra note 1.
54. Id.; see Ssenyonjo, supra note 41, at 412.
55. Kalinaki, supra note 1; Ssenyonjo, supra note 41, at 412.
56. Kalinaki, supra note 1; Ssenyonjo, supra note 41, at 412.
57. Kalinaki, supra note 1.
58. Todwong, supra note 36.
59. Kalinaki, supra note 1.
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with Lieutenant General Vincent Otti, the second in command of the LRA, the
host asked, "What is it that you are fighting for exactly?" 60 He replied, "I have
told you that we are fighting because of democracy, corruption, nepotism, and
whatever." 61 If the second in command of the LRA could not articulate a
common purpose, one may easily conclude that they did not have one.62
From the outset of the rebellion, the LRA relied on irregular guerilla war
tactics and fear inducing terror tactics aimed at civilian targets, especially
women and children.6 3 The LRA has been charged with numerous human rights
violations and war crimes including, but not limited to: murder, torture, rape,
enslavement, pillaging, and enlisting children. 64 An estimated 25,000 children
have been abducted by the LRA to be soldiers, sex slaves, porters, and human
shields in combat. 65 Children make up over eighty-five percent of the LRA
forces. 6 6 During a radio interview, Vincent Otti admitted to abducting people
for recruitment, saying, "That is a way of recruitment of guerillas."
' 67
The LRA lacks support from the general population, which compels it to
forcibly conscript children to fill its ranks. 68 Most children are between the ages
of eleven and fifteen, but children as young as six are also taken.69  The
preferred age has been declining "because younger children are easier to control,
and younger girls ... are less likely to be infected with HIV." 70 Abductees are
put through horrors designed to destroy their sense of self and transform them
into vicious killers loyal to their superiors out of fear.7 1 Children are initially
made to carry heavy loads of goods looted from villages by their captors.
72
Children are required to beat and kill those who cannot manage the loads, who
60. Rodney Muhumuza, I Had a Small Shop in Wandegeya - Otti, DAILY MONITOR (Uganda),
Sept. 8, 2006.
61. Id.
62. See id.
63. Ssenyonjo, supra note 41, at 411.
64. Moy, supra note 7, at 268-69.
65. Mike Pflanz, Ugandans Ready to Forgive 20 Years' Brutality, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Aug. 21,
2006, available at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2006/08/21/wuganda21 .xml&DCMP=E
MC-new 21082006; Moy, supra note 7, at 268.
66. Ssenyonjo, supra note 41, at 411-12.
67. Rodney Muhumuza, First Free Us from ICC, Says Otti, DAILY MONITOR (Uganda), Sept. 7,
2006.
68. Akhavan, supra note 12, at 407.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 407-08.
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disobey, or who attempt escape.73 Christopher Oyet, a formerly conscripted
child soldier, was kidnapped by the LRA when he was nine and forced to march
into the bush with other boys.74 The boys who could not make the trek were
beaten to death by the others, and everyone was forced to take part in the
killing.75 The LRA called it "registration. ' '76 Children who undergo this process
are severely traumatized and believe they can never return back to society.
77
About twenty percent of the children abducted are girls who become
"wives" (sex slaves) for the commanders.78 Joseph Kony is rumored to have
around sixty "wives." 79 Many girls become pregnant, and many are infected
with AIDS by their captors. "[T]he LRA released over one hundred 'child
mothers' with their children [in June 2000] because the children hindered theS,,81
LRA's movements. Children are especially vulnerable to abduction at night,
so thousands of village children commute to the towns like Gulu and Lacor each
night where they may be protected by the Ugandan army. s2 The children sleep
on the street, wherever they can find a place. 83
73. Id. at 408.
74. Gettleman, supra note 46.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Akhavan, supra note 12, at 408.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 409.
83. Akhavan, supra note 12, at 409.
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Almost two million people in the Acholi regions of Northern Uganda
8 4
have fled their homes and have sought shelter in filthy camps for internally
displaced persons ("IDPs"), relying on aid from agencies like the UN World
Food Programme for survival.8 5 In one typical camp, thousands of people must
line up to use the few available pit latrines while a dirty stream provides the
drinking water. 86 One observer stated that "more [people] are dying in the
camps through disease than the LRA ever managed to kill directly." 87 Aid
agencies estimate that 900 people die in the camps each week.88 The IDP camps
have provided little security for Northern Ugandans, as people have been
victimized by the LRA while in these camps and have also suffered depredations
at the hands of the Ugandan national military who were supposed to protect
them.89 In February 2004, two hundred people were massacred in an LRA
attack in the Barloonyo camp in Northeastern Uganda.
90
Map of Uganda, Infoplease.com, http://i.infoplease.com/images/muganda.gif (political map on
left); PanAfrican Localisation Project, Map of Uganda,
http://www.panafrill0n.org/wikidoc/maps/565px-Languages-ofUganda.png (For a map of
Uganda's language and ethnic groups, on the right. The northern Acholi region of Uganda has
seen great devastation as a result of the conflict.).
85. Moy, supra note 7, at 268-69; see also Kalinaki, supra, note 1; Akhavan, supra note 12, at
409.
86. Among, supra note 38.
87. Coming in from the Jungle, Maybe, supra note 11.
88. Peace in Uganda Hinges on Arrests Talks Break Down, Rebels Fear Court, PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE, October 8, 2006.
89. Moy, supra note 7, at 268.
90. Ssenyonjo, supra note 41, at 418.
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Uganda enacted The Amnesty Act, 2000 in hopes of ending the conflict
through forgiveness and reconciliation. 9 1 The Act extends to
any Ugandan who has... engaged in... war or armed rebellion
against the government of the Republic of Uganda by - (a) actual
participation in combat; (b) collaborating with the perpetrators of the
war or armed rebellion; (c) committing any other crime in the
furtherance of the war or armed rebellion; or (d) assisting or aiding the
conduct or prosecution of the war or armed rebellion. 92
A person may take advantage of the amnesty by reporting to the nearest
army or police unit, surrendering his or her weapons, renouncing involvement in
the rebellion, and taking a certificate of amnesty.93 When a person is granted
amnesty, he or she is immune from prosecution unless he or she commits a new
crime.
94
From the commencement of the Amnesty Commission in January 2000 to
June 2005, the Ugandan government granted amnesty to over 15,000 of the
LRA's combatants and abductees. 95 Amnesty is particularly appealing in the
case of the LRA, because many of the combatants were abducted as children and
forced to fight, thus being both rebels and victims.96 Although the granting of
amnesty for people forced to fight is widely supported in Uganda, there is debate
whether or not Kony and the LRA leaders should be allowed amnesty.97
According to a survey by the International Centre for Transitory Justice, more
than half the people in Northern Uganda support punishing Kony and his
leaders.
98
On December 16, 2003, Uganda's President Museveni referred the LRA
situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC). 99 Uganda's referral was the
ICC's first invitation for jurisdiction.100  After a year-long investigation, the
court issued warrants for Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, and
91. Id. at 419-20.
92. Id. at 420; Amnesty Act, 2000, Part 1(1 )(a)-(d), Republic of Uganda.
93. Ssenyonjo, supra note 41, at 420-2 1.
94. Id. at 420.
95. Id. at 421.
96. Id.
97. Compare Barbara Among, Ending the War Not an Easy Task, E. AFR., Sept. 5, 2006, with
Balancing Forgiveness with Justice, INTEGRATED REGIONAL INFORMATION NETWORKS, Sept. 6,
2006, available at http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=60819.
98. Redfem, supra note 19.
99. Moy, supra note 7, at 269.
100. Id.
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Dominic Ongwen, and Raska Lukwiya. l10 Ruska Lukwiya has since been
killed. °2 Because the ICC has no police force of its own, it must rely on
governments to enforce its warrants.'I As signatories to the court, Uganda and
Congo have an obligation to execute the ICC's warrants. 104 Despite not being a
signatory, Sudan has still pledged to do so.105
The war with the LRA and Kony has crippled Uganda economically and
socially. 106  In 1995, fifty-five percent of Uganda's households were self
sustaining; however, in 2000 that number had dropped to fifteen percent, as
estimated by the Ugandan Ministry of Finance. 107 The HIV rate is 1.6 percent
higher in the North than the national average, and the abject poverty rate in the
North has risen six percent while the national average has dropped six
percent. 108 Civil society organizations have "estimated the economic cost of the
war to be $1.3 billion and say it took three per cent off the gross domestic
product [each] year."' 10 9
Kony now finds himself in a difficult position in that his former backers in
Sudan's central government have abandoned him.110  Since the Islamic
government of Sudan signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement with the
Sudan People's Liberation Army in January 2005, Kony and the LRA have been
less welcome in Southern Sudan as the new President, Salva Kiir, has vowed to
oust them by force.111 Congo has also become less hospitable for the LRA since
the forces of the United Nations Mission in Congo have settled the areas where
the LRA sought to operate. 112  Uganda's President Museveni and South
Sudanese President Salva Kiir have agreed to join forces to fight Kony and the
LRA should the current peace efforts fail, leaving the LRA nowhere to hide.
113
101. Id. at 267-69.
102. Peace Talks - Govt Must Seek LRA Military Wing, NEW VISION (Uganda), Oct. 24, 2006,
available at http://www.newvision.co.ug/PA/8/459/528358.
103. Smyth, supra note 19.
104. Coming in from the Jungle, Maybe, supra note 11.
105. Id.
106. Kalinaki, supra note 1.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Coming in from the Jungle, Maybe, supra note 11.
111. Apuuli, supra note 49, at 187.
112. Id.
113. See Ugandan Government, Rebels Sign Truce, MONTEREY COUNTY HERALD, Aug. 27,
2006.
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B. Current State of Affairs
A cease-fire agreement came into effect between the Ugandan government
and the LRA on August 29, 2006.114 Under this agreement, the rebels had three
weeks to come out of hiding and make their way to designated areas in SouthernS 115
Sudan where negotiations would continue. A delegation from the Ugandan
government and rebel leaders have been meeting in Juba, the capital of Southern
Sudan.116 Museveni has promised amnesty to the LRA, including Kony and the
other leaders, if a comprehensive ceasefire is achieved. 117
Museveni is advocating that Kony and the leaders participate in the
traditional Ugandan reconciliation ceremony called "mato oput" instead of
facing an ICC trial. 1 18 The "mato oput" ceremony requires that the perpetrator
of the crime admit wrongdoing to the victim, ask forgiveness, and payS 119 " ""
compensation. The perpetrator and victim then share "a cup of sheep's blood
mixed with a bitter root." 120 Kony and the other leaders will have to come back
to Uganda to participate in the ritual. 121 The ceremony requires that the
offending clan go to the offended clan to plead for forgiveness. 122 Although he
is advocating for "mato oput," the ritual would not be between the LRA and
Museveni, it would be between the LRA and the victimized local population. 123
Clan leaders of the Acholi, Longo, Alur, Madi, Lugbara, Aringa, and Kakwa
people will join together to persuade the larger community to forgive the
LRA. 124 Despite Museveni having a reconciliatory tone towards the LRA, he
has expressed other sentiments, saying, "'That should be a big relief for him,
because Kony should be hanged for what he has done."'" 125
Although the rebels have been fighting for twenty years, the time has come
for Museveni to end the conflict. 126 Museveni has few supporters in the North,S127
receiving only twenty percent of the vote in that region. However, his
apparent lack of concern for the North impacts Uganda's status as a beneficiary
114. England, supra note 8.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. McConnell, supra note 9.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Todwong, supra note 36.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Coming in from the Jungle, Maybe, supra note 11 (quoting Vincent Otti, LRA deputy
leader).
126. Id.
127. England, supra note 8.
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of foreign aid, which provides about half of the Ugandan government's budget,
as other countries are less charitable to a callous leader. Further, Museveni
has changed the Ugandan constitution, allowing him to be elected for a third
presidential term, thereby sending an autocratic message to the world. 129  A
peaceful resolution to the conflict would go far in enhancing his image. 1
30
Meanwhile, the ICC is reluctant to revoke the indictments for Joseph Kony,
Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, and Dominic Ongwen on "speculation" that peace
may be reached. 131 Negotiations for peace have previously ended in failure.
132
The LRA is deeply suspicious that the peace talks may be a trap, while the
Ugandan government suspects that the LRA is using the time to re-arm.133
Uganda's leader of the government delegation at the Juba talks, Dr. Ruhakana
Rugunda, has repeatedly stated that the ICC will not impede the peace process
134
and that Uganda will convince the ICC to drop the indictments. 135 However, the
LRA has insisted on having the indictments dropped before reaching a final
agreement. 136  When given this ultimatum, Ruganda stated that "[t]he
government of Uganda has no authority to go to the ICC and withdraw the"',,37
indictments. The indictments are court procedures. He advised that the LRA
was in no position to give conditions to the ICC. 138 Rugunda described "the
position of the government [as] simple and straight forward," and added that
"[i]t's only when we are armed with a peace agreement and LRA has gone
through the "mato oput" process that the ICC can be asked to review the
indictments."13 9 However, Luis Moreno Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor for the ICC,
has remained steadfast in his commitment to prosecute Kony and the other LRA
leaders. 140
128. See Coming in from the Jungle, Maybe, supra note 11.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. Muhumuza, supra note 10.
132. England, supra note 8; Barbara Among, LRA Killings Create Mistrust Between Uganda and
Sudan, E. AFR., Oct. 23, 2006 (stating that "past peace talks between the government of Uganda
and the rebels broke down due to mistrust and counter accusation between the government of
Uganda and the rebels.").
133. Oloya, supra note 6.
134. Rodney Muhumuza, Talks in Trouble as LRA Makes U-Turn, DAILY MONITOR (Uganda),
Sept. 6, 2006; see Rodney Muhumuza, ICC Will not Interrupt Peace Deal, DAILY MONITOR
(Uganda), Sept. 4, 2006.
135. Muhumuza, Talks in Trouble as LRA Makes U-Turn, supra note 134.
136. Mukasa, supra note 13.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Muhumuza, supra note 10.
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The LRA have attempted to negotiate a power-sharing deal with the
Museveni administration, but the government has replied with a resolute
rejection of the proposal. 14 1 The rebels asked for social-economic emancipation
for Northern Uganda as well as government jobs. 142 A Ugandan government
minister replied that the LRA could register as a political party and participate in
the next elections if they want government power.
Kony and other leaders of the LRA claim they are innocent of the charges
against them.144 Kony has stated that the elders sent him to the bush, implying
that he was simply doing their will. 145 Dominic Ongwen has said, "'I did no
wrong. I was following and obeying lawful orders from my senior
commanders. ' 14 6 When Vincent Otti was asked in a radio interview about the
people who were raped and had their lips cut off, he claimed that all those
incidents were done by the Ugandan army, not the LRA.147 It is difficult to
imagine how the leaders of the LRA will reconcile with the Ugandan people
when they do not think they have done anything wrong.
If peace is reached in the region, 1.7 million displaced Ugandans may
return to their homes. 14 8  President Museveni has announced a deadline of
December 31, 2006 for all IDP camps to close. 149  Jan Egeland, the UN
Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator,
expressed optimism that Northern Uganda could recover once the fighting
141. Barbara Among, Peace Talks Enter Crucial Stage This Week, E. AFR., Sept. 26, 2006.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Estanislao Oziewicz, Sustainable Peace Unlikely in Uganda, Rights Group Warns, GLOBE
& MAIL, Aug. 30, 2006, available at
http://theglobe.ca/servlet/story/RTGAM.20060830.wxuganda3O/BNStory/Intemational; Kintu
Nyago, Kony Should Face International Court, NEW VISION (Uganda), Sept. 9, 2004; Kony Comes
In from the Cold, supra note 1.
145. Kony Comes In from the Cold, supra note 1 (quoting Dominic Ongwen, Brigade
Commander of the Sinia Brigade of the Lord's Resistance Army).
146. Nyago, supra note 144.
147. Muhumuza, supra note 60.
148. McConnell, supra note 9.
149. Chris Ocowun, IDP Camps Close in December, NEW VISION (Uganda), Oct. 30, 2006,
available at http://www.newvision.co.ug/PA/8/12/529377 (stating that "[r]elief and disaster
preparedness minister Tarsis Kabwegyere said... '[n]othing will stop us from achieving this
because we have everything in place. The disaster management and security committees are there.
We have also recruited 29 resettlement officers to ensure that by December 31 all the camps are
empty." Museveni also said "[w]e are in full gear to resettle you in your villages. We have
mobilised some money to resettle you.").
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ends. 150 He stated that "[t]his part of the world can and will feed itself because
there are fertile lands that had to be abandoned because of the conflict."'
5 1
III. THE LRA AND ITS BACKGROUND WITHIN UGANDAN SOCIETY
A casual observer from a Western European perspective may find it
incomprehensible that Ugandans would be willing to forgive the reprehensible
acts perpetrated by the LRA. However, to understand Uganda's position, one
must look into the context in which Ugandan society operates. "No matter how
strange or irrational the behavior of a person, an ethnic group, or a nation may
seem to the outsider, it makes sense in terms of the world view of that person,
ethnic group, or nation."
152
A. Historical Background
The oldest political institutions in the world are believed to be the kingdoms
that arose out of inner-African antiquity.' 53 The authority of the African kings
was supported by the elders, chiefs of clans, and the like, bolstered by religious
beliefs. 154  The kingdoms of Africa were in a continuous state of internal
development until European Colonization. 155 These pre-colonial communities
embodied Africa's distinctive cultural history founded on the spiritual
relationships between living people and their ancestors. 156  These religious
beliefs gave the culture its meaning and value, and acted to regulate social and
political action. 157 Upon colonization, the African model of community was
replaced with a European model of community, but the inward convictions of the
African people remained largely untouched outside the colonial centers. 158 The
European model rested on the principle of individual advancement while the
African model relied on an all-encompassing community. 159
When Uganda gained independence from Britain in 1962, it had great
potential since the producers of Ugandan wealth were African and not a
150. Chris Ocowun, UN Chief Talks with LRA Deputy Otti, NEW VISION (Uganda), Sept. 10,
2006, available at http://www.newvision.co.ug/PA/8/12/520322.
151. Id.
152. Hasan EI-Shamy, African World View and Religion, in AFRICA 208 (Phyllis M. Martin &
Patrick O'Meara eds., 1977).
153. DAVIDSON, supra note 40, at 19, 21.
154. Id. at 21.
155. Id. at 38.
156. Id. at 256.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 257.
159. DAVIDSON, supra note 40, at 259.
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European settler class. 160 Uganda had rich natural resources, a prosperous
middle-class of educated Africans, and a thriving economy. Britain
voluntarily departed Uganda, leaving an improved infrastructure behind.
162
However, since Britain left Uganda before the people had a need to organize a
movement to expel the colonists, the country's diverse ethnic groups had no
reason to connect as a unified nation. 163 The 1962 elections created a coalition
government of one group with nationalist aspirations and another rooted firmly
in tribal tradition. 16 Rifts between the Bantu-speaking people of the south
(nationalists), and the Nilotic-speaking people of the north (tribalists)
remained, 165 as the south benefited from British investment at the expense of the
other regions. 16 6 The lack of nationalism and the divide between the tribes left• 167
Uganda vulnerable to instability after independence.
Political instability led to Milton Obote's rule under martial law, then a
military coup in 1971, by Idi Amin Dada, followed by Amin's brutal leadership,
and the even bloodier second term of Obote during the civil war of 1981-
1985. 16 8 Western democracy did not thrive after post-colonial independence in• 169 ..
Africa as a whole and Uganda was no exception. Competitive party politics
and popular elections which indicated a system of political competition based on
ethnic divisions were sacrificed for one-party regimes that represented the whole
without regard to tribal differences. 170
When Yoweri Museveni claimed the presidency in 1986, Uganda was in
great need of reconstruction. 17 1 Museveni outlined a ten-point program that
called for 1) a real democracy, 2) the elimination of state-inspired violence, 3)
the elimination of religious, linguistic, and ethic divisions in politics, 4) the
elimination of international interference in domestic affairs, 5) a self-sustaining
national economy, 6) the restoration of basic social services, 7) the elimination
of government corruption, 8) reparations to victims of past regimes, 9)
160. FED. RESEARCH Div., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, UGANDA: A COUNTRY STUDY 3 (Rita M.
Byrnes ed., 2d ed. 1992).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 4.
163. Id.
164. MARTIN MEREDITH, THE FIRST DANCE OF FREEDOM: BLACK AFRICA IN THE POSTWAR ERA
219 (1984).
165. Id. at 220.
166. FED. RESEARCH Div., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 160, at 4-5.
167. Id. at 5.
168. Id. at 3; see also id. at 20-35; MEREDITH, supra note 164, at 219-34.
169. Ruth Berins Collier, Political Change and Authoritarian Rule, in AFRICA 295, 296 (Phyllis
M. Martin & Patrick O'Meara eds., 1997).
170. Id. at 296-98.
171. FED. RESEARCH Div., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 160, at 36.
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cooperation with other African nations, and 10) a mixed economy with private
and public interests. 172 However, the Museveni government came to power
before it was prepared to govern, and it has not been able to completely
implement the ten-point plan. 173 Nonetheless, Museveni has implemented both
the resistance councils ("RCs") and an elected local administration for all
villages, parishes, sub-counties, and districts in line with the first point of the
plan-a democracy at every level of government. 174  Museveni has also
eliminated the use of child soldiers, or kadogos, in the Ugandan army since
taking office. 175  The government opened the Mbarara Kadogo School in
February 1988 to both educate former child soldiers and deter them from joining
groups like the LRA. 176 The school enrolled about 800 children between the
ages of five and eighteen.
177
Africa, including Uganda, is searching for a balance between its lost
heritage and its imported ideology. 178 Africa is looking to restore its ability to
solve its own problems and make its own choices as it did before colonialism. 1
79
Historians have noted long periods of productive expansion without corruption
in Africa's past.' 80 Lessons from Africa's ancient communities in preventing the
abuse of executive power could be renewed to benefit the twenty-first century. 181
The value to the African people would come in a stable society made legitimate
by that society's own traditions. 182  Unfortunately, "today Africa is more
dependant than ever on rich countries [and] more vulnerable" to exploitation.
183
Africa must restore its identity, self-respect, and collective self-confidence to
flourish.
184
B. African Cultural Background
The impact of family and social group dynamics, religion and mysticism,
and traditional justice must be explored to understand the context surrounding
Uganda's readiness to forgive Joseph Kony.
172. Id. at 150-51.
173. Id. at 149.
174. Id. at 162.
175. Id. at214-16.
176. Id. at 216.
177. FED. RESEARCH Div., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 161, at 216.
178. DAVIDSON, supra note 40, at 281.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 248.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 251, 281-90.
183. Etounga-Manguelle, supra note 28, at 66.
184. DAVIDSON, supra note 40, at 175-76.
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1. Clan and Family
The most important social groups in Africa are clans; they are even
recognized as land-owning, legal entities. 185 Clan members rely on one another
in times of crisis and need, giving both psychological and material support. 186 A
person's clan is his or her source of identity, reputation, and pride. Africa's
kinship system provides individuals with a group of primary kinsmen with
.• 188
whom they have close cooperation. "Kinsman" is broadly defined and may
include people who are not blood relatives, but who have a close relationship
with the individual. 189  In African societies, kinship is the central factor for• . 190
social organization.
Families in Africa are organized to facilitate economic productivity, as they
are the primary economic unit of the society. 19 1 An African marriage is, in
essence, between two groups of people, instead of between two individuals, as
each individual represents his or her group. 19 2  A payment made from the
groom's family to the bride's family, called bridewealth, compensates the bride's
family for the loss of her labor and gives both families an interest in the
continued existence of the marriage. 19 3  The marriage is negotiated by the
families, and the bride and groom are seldom present when the bride price is
negotiated. 1
94
The payment and acceptance of the bridewealth is not considered a
"purchase" of the bride. 195  One family has invested its resources in the
marriage, and the other family may have to return the bridewealth should the
marriage fail. 196 If the wife is at fault for the failure of the marriage, then the
bridewealth is returned; but if the husband is to blame, then the wife's family
retains the payment. 197  The payment of bridewealth is the symbol of the
legitimacy of the union, analogous to a marriage certificate in other cultures.
198
185. Vaughan, supra note 30, at 175-76.
186. Id. at 176.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 176-77.
189. Id. at 177.
190. Hasan EI-Shamy, supra note 152, at 211.
191. Vaughan, supra note 30, at 170.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Norbert Mao, Juba Talks are Like African Marriage Negotiations, NEW VISION (Uganda),
Oct. 30, 2006, available at http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/20/529329.
195. Michael Armer & Marian Gewirtz, Sociocultural Change in Contemporary Africa, in
AFRICA 280, 284 (Phyllis M. Martin & Patrick O'Meara eds., 1977).
196. Vaughan, supra note 30, at 170.
197. Armer, supra note 195, at 284.
198. Vaughan, supra note 30, at 170.
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Polygyny, the practice of men having more than one wife, is favored in
ninety-eight percent of African societies, although most marriages in Africa are
not, in fact, polygynous. 199 To make polygyny feasible, men marry at a later age
than women, resulting in fewer men of marriageable age than women to offset
the relatively male-to-female ratio. 20 Polygynous marriage allows each mother
to have fewer children which improves maternal health and lowers infant
fatality.201 Greater fertility jeopardizes the health of both the mother and the
infant.202 Also, polygynous marriages make for very large extended families,
which provide the source of labor for the family, the economic unit in
agricultural societies.
203
The most basic institution of traditional African society is a man's descent
group, which includes his parents and grandparents, siblings, aunts and uncles,
and cousins.204 This group exerts its influence on every aspect of life. 205 The
head of the descent group establishes the value system and makes directives for
the others, who tend to be unconditionally loyal to him.206 The group provides
security, protection, and companionship for its members, but its members can
also be held accountable as a group for wrongdoing of individual members.
20 7
However, the notion of collective responsibility is in decline in modern Africa,
as jobs are given to individuals and state criminal liability is assessed on
individuals, not families.208 Given the nature of the large extended families and
the connection between individuals as kinsmen, it is apparent that clans can be
quite large and exert a great deal of influence on its members.
2. Religion and Mysticism
In the late 1980s, about nineteen percent of Ugandans believed in local
religions.209 Religion serves the social function of reinforcing group solidarity,
resolving disputes, remembering ancestors, recognizing individual achievement,
and helping people cope with pain, suffering, and defeat. 2 1  It also serves the
199. Id. at 170-71.
200. Id. at 171.
201. Id. at 172, cited in Vernon R. Dorjahn, The Factor of Polygyny in African Demography, in
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN AFRICAN CULTURES 109-12 (William R. Bascom & Melville J.
Herskovits, eds., 1959).
202. Vaughan supra note 31, at 172.
203. Id.
204. Armer, supra note 195, at 281.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. FED. RESEARCH Div., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 160, at 74.
210. Id.
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political function of bolstering the authority of rulers and allowing leaders to
mobilize people for political aims. 2 11  Ancestors are believed to support
authority by punishing transgressions against elders by killing or striking a
descent group leader. The transgressor can engage a spiritual healer and pay
the penalty to avert the disaster.2Y3 "Illness is ... [believed to result from]
flouting the authority of an elder."214 All manner of misfortunes provide the
opportunity for examination of one's own actions and relationships, admit
wrongdoing, and give compensation to the harmed.2 15  These functions of
religion contribute to the stability of society.2 16 Although the African religious
beliefs are often referred to as ancestor worship, the Africans do not deify or
actually worship their ancestors. 2 17 Instead, "dead ancestors are feared, placated
through food offerings and rituals, or simply revered ... "218
Uganda has also been susceptible to cult-like religions led by charismatic
prophets who pledge relief from suffering and promise a "golden age. ' 219 These
cults were formed in response to rapid changes in the culture, and sought to220
overthrow the political regime that tolerated such changes to happen. The
prophet often makes extraordinary demands on its followers. The most
successful of these cults was the Yakan cult in the late nineteenth century, which
promised "restored health, eternal life, and the return of the ancestors and dead
cattle" to those who drank the water of Yakan.222 Another such cult was the
Holy Spirit Movement which was a precursor to the LRA. 223 Alice Lakwena, an
Acholi prophet, claimed that her followers could protect themselves from bullets
by rubbing cooking oil on themselves.2 24  She also claimed that "stones or
bottles thrown at government troops would turn into hand grenades. ' 225 Many
Holy Spirit Movement followers were killed in confrontations with government
211. Id.
212. Id. at 75.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. FED. RESEARCH Div., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 160, at 75.
216. See Id.
217. El-Shamy, supra note 152, at 213.
218. Id.
219. FED. RESEARCH Div., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 161, at 76.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. (Yakan water is water collected from springs in the neighboring territory of Lugbara.).
223. Id. at 77.
224. Id.
225. FED. RESEARCH Div., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 160, at 77.
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troops as a result of such claims. 226 "Alice," as Lakwena was called, claimed to
get messages from the spirit world.
227
Magic and witchcraft flourish in African society. 228 They are used as tools
of social coercion, since they "increase the loyalty of individuals toward the
clan."229 It is also used as a political weapon to eliminate new opposition.
230
African presidents even surround themselves with occult counselors. 31 The
introduction of Christianity has also unexpectedly legitimized witchcraft in
Africa.23 2 The existence of Satan in the Christian religion has "confirm[ed] the
existence of sorcerers and other evil persons. '233 Magic practitioners, claiming
to be prophets, get rich detecting evil spirits, protecting against disease,
protecting one's job, or enhancing one's income.234
In Africa, not just cult leaders claim magical powers. The African
culture predisposes people to believe that those in power have divine
authority. 236 Changes in social standing are taboo, as Africans believe that those
born dominant were meant to have power over those born dominated. 237 A
person who is not born dominant "ha[s] no right to power except by coup
d',6tat.''238  For the most part, African society accepts the leadership of the
day.2
39
3. Traditional Justice
Traditional justice in Uganda balances "the need to punish individuals for
their crimes ... against the need to restore wholeness to the community."
24 0
This view comes from Africa's unique sense of communalism-a pragmatic part
of the culture "enshrined in tribal jurisprudence [which dictates that] [v]illages in
small, poor communities need every last person to survive. ' 241 Traditional
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Etounga-Manguelle, supra note 28, at 73.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at74.
232. Id. at 73.
233. Id.
234. Etounga-Manguelle, supra note 28, at 74.
235. Id. at 70.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. See id.
240. McLaughlin, supra note 33.
241. Id.
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justice calls for restoring harmony in the community. 242 For example, traditional
justice dictates that when a murder is committed, the clans of the perpetrator and
victim must avoid one another as a cooling off period to avoid revenge killing.
243
The perpetrator is never obligated to confess his crime; however, there is a
common belief that "spirits - or departed ancestors - will punish him until he
confesses." 244 If a person has a string of bad luck, the community presumes he
is covering up a misdeed.
245
The Acholi believe that the spirit of the dead will plague the family of the
guilty until compensation is paid, "mato oput" is performed, and the last funeral
rites are held.2 4  Compensation may be delayed for generations, but must be
paid to cleanse the clan.247  "The wealth from [the payment] enables the
bereaved family to marry a wife who will bear" a child, replacing the dead
family member.24 8 The first child born with the same gender of the dead person
is named after that person.
24 9
Africans do not understand the Western logic for finding justice.250 They
see lawyers as clever people dueling before a judge, trying to outsmart each
other, while avoiding exposing the truth about their client. 5 1 In traditional
Ugandan justice, once the perpetrator confesses, a mediator goes between the
two clans to negotiate "an agreement by which the perpetrator's clan agrees to
pay the victim's clan a certain amount. ' 252 The currency, that traditionally was
in the form of cows, now takes the form of money. The amount of the
agreement depends on the nature of the killing and the identity of the person
killed.2 54 Once an agreement is reached, every member of the perpetrator's clan
contributes to the settlement amount.255 "All in the group are seen as responsible
for allowing the perpetrator to err. So punishment is distributed."
' 256
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. A Better Way to Resolve Conflict, DAILY MONITOR (Uganda), Oct. 24, 2006.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. McLaughlin, supra note 33.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. A Better Way to Resolve Conflict, supra note 246.
255. McLaughlin, supra note 33.
256. Id.
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The final ritual concludes the traditional justice method. 2 57 Each group
brings a goat to the ceremony, and each goat is cut in half.258 Each clan
exchanges one half, thus "creat[ing] two goats that are whole again. ' 259 In a
society where every person is needed to haul water and do everyday tasks for
survival, the community would crumble if people had to be forever separated.
260
Such traditional justice method is still used in Uganda today, even though it is
not a quick process.26 1 For instance, a murder in 1977 in Northern Uganda was
not resolved until 2005. 262
Once viewed through the eyes of African culture, the LRA rebellion and the
Ugandan response to the rebellion are more understandable. However, this point
of view is at odds with Western ideas of society and justice, and it is the Western
concept of justice that prevails with the ICC.
IV. THE ICC's STAKE IN THE CONFLICT
In the aftermath of World War II, the world community vowed not to allow
atrocities against humanity like the Holocaust happen again. 263  However,
governments either were not in a position to hold perpetrators accountable and
deter future crimes against humanity, or they merely ignored the problem.
264
International demands for justice brought about investigative commissions and
ad hoc tribunals, but atrocities like the Rwandan genocide still occurred.
265
Worse yet, less publicized atrocities went unnoticed and unpunished.266 The
need for a permanent international criminal court that could consistently apply
justice brought about the drafting of the treaty establishing the International
Criminal Court.267 "[O]n July 17, 1998, the final Statute of the International
Criminal Court was completed" at the Rome Conference.
268
The ICC is a permanent treaty-based institution created to investigate and
prosecute perpetrators "genocide. . [c]rimes against humanity ... [w]ar
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. McLaughlin, supra note 33.
262. Id.
263. M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Permanent International Criminal Court, in JUSTICE FOR CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY 173 (Mark Lattimer & Philippe Sands QC eds., 2003).
264. Id. at 173-74.
265. Id. at 174 n.5.
266. Id. at 175.
267. Id. at 175-76.
268. ERIC K. LEONARD, THE ONSET OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
THEORY AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 45 (2005).
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crimes... [and] aggression." 269 The court's jurisdiction only extends to state
parties. 27  Its jurisdiction is complementary to the state parties' national legal
systems, meaning that the state's criminal jurisdiction has primacy over the ICC
. .. . 271 . . ..
jurisdiction. The ICC may exercise jurisdiction when a state is unwilling or
unable to investigate or prosecute crimes under the court's subject matter
jurisdiction. 272
A state party may also refer a situation to the court, allowing the court to
investigate and prosecute crimes associated with that situation. A referral
encompasses a situation in its entirety, including all parties, not just particular
defendants. 2 74 Thus, when Museveni referred the LRA situation to the ICC, he
was also inviting the court's scrutiny of acts by the Ugandan army.275 Several
organizations, including Human Rights Watch and the International Crisis
Group, have criticized the ICC for not investigating allegations of abuse
perpetrated by Ugandan forces. 2 76 The ICC has defended its decision to focus
on the LRA, because the crimes committed by the LRA are more numerous and
277
severe.
A. Will the ICC Maintain Legitimacy if Uganda Fails to Cooperate?
The Preamble to the Rome Statute states that "the most serious crimes of
concern to the international community as a whole must not go
unpunished .... .278 One intention of the ICC is to "act as a deterrent to...
humanitarian law violators. ' 279 Of course, the court will have to enforce its first
sentence for would-be violators to take notice.280  Nicholas Grono of the
269. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5, July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M 999
[hereinafter Rome Statute], available at
http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/english/rome-statute(e).pdf (last visited April 8, 2007);
Bassiouni, supra note 264, at 180.
270. Bassiouni, supra note 263, at 181.
271. Id.
272. Rome Statute, supra note 269, art. 17.
273. Id. arts.13-14.
274. Akhavan, supra note 12, at 411.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Moy, supra note 7, at 269.
278. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Preamble, July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M 999.
279. LEONARD, supra note 268, at 49; see also Eric Blumenson, The Challenge of a Global
Standard of Justice: Peace, Pluralisn, and Punishment at the International Criminal Court, 44
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 801, 825 (2006) (stating that "[m]any people argue that if genocide and
crimes against humanity are reliably prosecuted and punished, a deterrent effect should follow-if
not for some megalomaniacal leaders, at least for the subordinates who would otherwise carry out
their orders.").
280. LEONARD, supra note 268, at 49.
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International Crisis Group stated that "[i]t is critically important that the ICC
gets convictions under its belt," and that "[i]f it is continuously trumped by
peace processes it will never have a deterrent effect." 28' The ICC does not have
its own enforcement mechanism, and must rely on state parties to enforce its
warrants and sentences. 282 Judge Philippe Kirsh, the ICC President, expressed
frustration with "the [c]ourt's inability to execute arrests for war criminals"
during his presentation to the UN General Assembly.
283
As a signatory to the ICC, Uganda is obligated to enforce the court's
orders. 284 If state parties like Uganda refuse to cooperate with the ICC, the
treaty becomes dead letter-unofficially disregarded and not enforced.2 85 if
Uganda does not comply with the ICC's order to relinquish Kony, the ICC can
refer "the matter to the Assembly of State Parties or the United Nations' Security,-.287
Council." 286 However, that also relies on state parties for enforcement.
1. Importance of Uganda Being the First State Referral to the ICC
On December 16, 2003, Uganda referred the LRA rebellion to the ICC,
marking the first time the court had been granted jurisdiction under Articles
13(a) and 14 of the Rome Statute.288 The Rome Statute had only been in force
since July 1, 2002, and the court was looking for its first case in order to gain
legitimacy. 2 89 The ICC wanted the Democratic Republic of Congo to refer the
murder of five thousand civilians in Ituri to the court, but Congo declined to do
so. 29  Luis Moreno Ocampo, the ICC prosecutor, preferred to have a case
voluntarily referred rather than risk creating an adversarial relationship with a
member state, but he would seek authorization to initiate an investigation if
291
necessary.
When Uganda referred the LRA situation to the ICC, the conflict had
received little international attention, and its referral to the ICC was
unexpected. 292  'UN officials often [have] refer[red] to the conflict as the
281. ICC Says Uganda Crimes May Go on Without Arrests, supra note 39.
282. LEONARD, supra note 268, at 61.
283. Emmanuel Gyezaho & Frank Nyakairu, Government Still Wants ICC to Arrest Koni and
Otti, DAILY MONITOR (Uganda), Oct. 11, 2006.
284. Coming in from the Jungle, Maybe, supra note 11.
285. LEONARD, supra note 268, at 61.
286. Id. at 61-62.
287. Id. at 62.
288. Akhavan, supra note 12, at 403.
289. Id. at 405.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 405-06.
292. Id. at 405, 409.
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world's worst and most forgotten." 2 93 The referral altered the political balance
in the region, prompting Congo to also refer its conflict, which has killed
millions of civilians, to the ICC on April 19, 2004.294 Uganda's LRA referral
served as a catalyst for the Darfur Security Council referral and the Central
African Republic referral the next year as well. 295 Uganda's referral to the ICC
pressured Sudan to stop harboring the LRA which, in turn, weakened the rebel
group.2 96  Moreover, none of the senior LRA commanders had accepted
Uganda's offer of amnesty before the ICC arrest warrants were issued. 297 Then,
"[in February 2005 ... the LRA's top negotiator [] surrendered to the [Ugandan
1,298
army]. Uganda's long term prospects for peace have steadily increased since
it referred the LRA situation to the ICC.
299
The shift in the balance of power in the LRA position gave the ICC its
needed legitimacy and reinforced the court's global influence over deterrence of
crime generally. 30 These events certainly encouraged the ICC to continue
pursuit of insurgent leaders, like Joseph Kony, who commit atrocities against
humanity. 30 1 In the LRA's case, arrest and prosecution of the leadership would
have an immediate impact on the rebellion's operations. 302 Since most of the
rebellion's forces are conscripted children, the rebel forces should quickly
disperse without the commanders present to compel allegiance through terror. W
The ICC indictments have been a catalyst for the current peace initiative.
304
They have "created an incentive for the [LRA leaders] to negotiate," cast an
international spotlight on the conflict, and pressured Sudan to cease funding the
LRA forces. 305  Although supporters of the Juba talks have cited the ICC
indictments as a barrier to the peace negotiations, the indictments provide
leverage that ensures the parties stay committed to negotiating. 306
293. Rob Crilly, War Resumes with Ugandan Rebels, IRISH TIMES, Oct. 5, 2006.
294. Akhavan, supra note 12, at 406; see also Press Release, International Criminal Court, The
Office of the International Criminal Court Opens its First Investigation (June 23, 2004), available
at http://www.icc-cpi.int/pressreleasedetails&id=26&l=en.html.
295. Akhavan, supra note 12, at 406.
296. Id. at416.
297. Id. at 418.
298. Id. at 417.
299. Id. at 418.
300. Id. at 419.
301. Akhavan, supra note 12, at 419.
302. Id. at 420.
303. Id.
304. Nick Grono & Adam O'Brian, Exorcising the Ghost of the ICC, DAILY MONITOR (Uganda),
Oct. 31, 2006.
305. Id.
306. Id.
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ICC officials are concerned that suspending or dropping the indictments
against Kony would undermine its investigations in Congo, the Central African
Republic, and Darfur by encouraging other warlords to demand the same
treatment. 307 Further, Foday Sankoh's amnesty in Sierra Leone reinforced the
idea that sometimes "violence pays. ' 3°8 Using his negotiated position as the
head of the Diamond Mining Commission allowed Sankoh to fund further
crimes.309  The ICC has plenty of incentive to follow through with its
indictments of Kony and the LRA leadership.
310
2. Foreign Reaction to the ICC Prosecution of the Rebel Leaders
The European Union stands behind the ICC in prosecuting Kony and the
LRA rebel leaders. 311 Finland, the current EU presidency holder, gave the EU's
support at the September 1- 2, 2006 meeting of EU foreign ministers inS 312
Lappeenranta, Finland. Finnish foreign minister Erkki Tuomioja said that
"[iun principle it is clear that anyone who is indicted by the International
Criminal Court should stand trial. That is a very important principle."
313
Likewise, Dermot Ahern, the foreign minister for Ireland, expressed support for
the ICC and its indictments of Kony and the LRA leaders. 314 Britain has also
taken the stand that Kony and his leaders should face trial by the ICC.
315
Britain is integral to the UN Security Council, which is debating a
resolution on the Uganda situation.3 16 The Ugandan government requested that
the Security Council delay in passing the resolution, 317 and the Council has
decided to delay the decision until the outcome of the Juba talks is clear. 3 18 The
resolution calls for the indictment of collaborators and sponsors of the rebellion
as well as the rebel leaders.319 It also allows for a joint offensive operation with
the UN, Ugandan Army, Sudanese Army, and Congolese Army against the LRA
307. Chris Stephen, Uganda's Peace Talks Called Offas Warlord's Amnesty Ruled Out, IRISH
TIMES, Sept. 16, 2006.
308. Akhavan, supra note 12, at 420.
309. Jack Snyder & Leslie Vinjamuri, A Midwife for Peace, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 27, 2006.
310. See generally id.; see also Stephen, supra note 307.
311. Smyth, supra note 19.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Redfern, supra note 19.
316. Emmy Allio, Uganda Asks UN to Delay Action on LRA Rebels, NEW VISION (Uganda),
Sept. 12, 2006, available at http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/12/520676.
317. Id.
318. Peace Talks - Govt Must Seek LRA Military Wing, supra note 102.
319. Allio, supra note 316.
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in Garamba National Park in Congo. 32  Nonetheless, Jan Egeland, the UN
Secretary General of Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator,
stated in a press conference that the ICC's outstanding indictments were a
"stumbling block" to the peace negotiation in Northern Uganda.32 1 However,
Egeland later clarified his position stating that Uganda's rebels must face justice,
whether through the ICC or traditional ustice, saying that "[t]he peace process
cannot give impunity for war crimes."
32)
Not surprisingly, the Victims Rights Working Group, an advocacy body for
victims' rights at the ICC, has stated that "denying the victims justice would not
achieve sustainable peace. ' 323 The group warns that rebels given amnesty in the
past have continued to perpetrate human rights violations on victims. It also
stated that "[i]nternational obligations to ensure justice for crimes under
international law should be upheld."
' 325
Alex Little, a former ICC consultant and assistant to former President
Jimmy Carter's conflict resolution effort in Uganda, mentioned that the gravity
of the leaders' crimes deserves a clear rebuke. 6 He criticized the government
of Uganda for negotiating with terrorists and offering the leaders immunity.
327
He stated that "[ijf Kony's attempt to gain immunity succeeds, the consequences
will be grave: [w]arlords will gain confidence that, if armed rebellion fails, they
can leverage brutality to dictate the terms of their surrender... [a]nd terrorism
will grow more common."
328
3. Impact of Enforcing the Warrants for Arrest Versus the Impact of
Passivity
The ICC may impose a sentence of life imprisonment, 329 although the
Rome Statute reserves this for cases "when justified by the extreme gravity of
320. Peace Talks - Govt Must Seek LRA Military Wing, supra note 102.
321. Grace Matsiko, Frank Nyakairu, & Paul Harera, Kony Charges a Stumbling Block, Says UN
Chief DAILY MONITOR (Uganda), Sept. 13, 2006.
322. Tim Cocks, Uganda's LRA Rebels Must Not Escape Justice: U.N., REUTERS, Sept. 9, 2006.
323. Advocacy Body Pleads for War Victims' Rights, NEW VISION (Uganda), Sept. 8, 2006,
available at http://www.newvision.co.ug/PA/8/13/520010.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Alex Little, Don't Let Uganda's War Criminals off the Hook, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Oct. 12, 2006, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/1006/pO9sO1-coop.html.
327. Id.; see also Peace Talks - Govt Must Seek LRA Military Wing, supra note 102 (stating
"that the Juba talks have helped to transform LRA from the rogue gang of killers who were
shunned by people to a group with 'serious political programmes' [sic] and whose spokesmen are
accorded equal publicity with other power centres.").
328. Little, supra note 326.
329. Rome Statute, supra note 269, art. 77.
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the crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted person."330
Otherwise, the maximum sentence is thirty years, and the court is authorized to
release the prisoner under certain circumstances. 331 During the negotiation of
the Rome Statute, capital punishment was widely debated and life imprisonmentS332
became the compromise. The ICC has limited resources to prosecute
criminals, so less responsible offenders will never be brought before the court.
333
Therefore, no one but the most heinous offenders will be brought before the
court.334 Yet, the court reserves life imprisonment for only cases of extreme
gravity.335  It follows that all cases in which the ICC has subject matter
jurisdiction are possible life imprisonment cases since the court only prosecutes
atrocious crimes against humanity.
The ICC has no prison and relies on state parties to provide incarceration
facilities.336 If no state party volunteers facilities, the Netherlands will take the
prisoner.337 James Otto, the director of the Gulu advocacy group Human Rights
Focus, noted that Kony would be living better in prison than he has been in the
bush.3 38 Otto said that "[i]f Kony goes to the [sic] Hague, he has TV, flushing
toilet .... Here, he would have to publicly apologise for all the crimes under his
leadership. ' 339 One commentator remarked that if Kony were to be imprisoned
by the ICC, he would be living in better conditions, if compared to the
.. .. . .. 340
conditions lived by his victims, the Acholi, Teso, and Lango people. Further,
Kony could possibly pursue an education during his sentence, if imprisoned by
the ICC, while generations of Northern Ugandans have forgone education in fear
for their safety.341 These conditions, coupled with the opportunity for parole,
330. WILLIAM SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 162-63 (2d
ed. 2004); Rome Statute, supra note 269, art. 77.
331. SCHABAS, supra note 330, at 166-67; Rome Statute, supra note 269, art. 77.
332. SCHABAS, supra note 330, at 165.
333. Blumenson, supra note 279, at 818.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 807.
336. SCHABAS, supra note 330, at 169.
337. Id. at 170.
338. Steve Bloomfield, Power of Forgiveness Offers Hope for Peace in War-Torn Uganda,
INDEP. (UK), Sept. 25, 2006, available at
http://news.independent.co.uk/world/africa/article1747158.ece.
339. Id.
340. Jude Ogik, The Truth Is; There Isn't Penalty Enough for LRA, DAILY MONITOR (Uganda),
Oct. 24, 2006.
341. Id.
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seem rather unfair to some Ugandans. 342 Critics note that if Kony were tried in
Uganda, the maximum penalty would be death.
343
In determining whether to continue with a case, the ICC prosecutor is
required to consider the interests of the victims when weighing whether the
interests of justice would be served by proceeding. 344 The court may focus on
reparations to victims under the principles of "restitution, compensation, and
rehabilitation." 345  The ICC gives a victim the right to participate in the
proceedings, which is innovative in international justice. 346 The court may order
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. SCHABAS, supra note 330, at 172-73; Rome Statute, supra note 269, art. 54. (stating that
"[t]he Prosecutor shall ... [t]ake appropriate measures to ensure the effective investigation and
prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, and in doing so, respect the interests and
personal circumstances of victims and witnesses .... ").
345. SCHABAS, supra note 330, at 174 (quoting Christopher Muttukumaru, Reparations to
Victims, in ESSAYS ON THE ROME STATUTE 303-10 (Flavia Lattanzi & William A. Schabas, eds.,
2000)). The Rome Statute addresses reparations to victims in article 75:
[t]he Court shall establish principles relating to reparations to, or in respect of,
victims, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation. On this basis,
in its decision the Court may, either upon request or on its own motion in
exceptional circumstances, determine the scope and extent of any damage, loss
and injury to, or in respect of, victims and will state the principles on which it is
acting.").
Rome Statute, supra note 269, art. 75, para. 1.
346. Gerard J. Mekjian & Matthew C. Varughese, Hearing the Victim's Voice: Analysis of
Victims' Advocate Participation in the Trial Proceeding of the International Criminal Court, 17
PACE INT'L L. REv. 1, 15 (2005); Rome Statute, supra note 269. art. 15, para. 3 (stating that
"[v]ictims may make representations to the Pre-Trial Chamber, in accordance with the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence."); Rome Statute, supra note 269, art. 19, para. 3 (noting that "[tihe
Prosecutor may seek a ruling from the Court regarding a question of jurisdiction or admissibility.
In proceedings with respect to jurisdiction or admissibility, those who have referred the situation
under article 13, as well as victims, may also submit observations to the Court."). The Rome
Statute allows victims to participate in the proceedings:
[w]here the personal interests of the victims are affected, the Court shall permit
their views and concerns to be presented and considered at stages of the
proceedings determined to be appropriate by the Court and in a manner which
is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and
impartial trial. Such views and concerns may be presented by the legal
representatives of the victims where the Court considers it appropriate, in
accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.... The Victims and
Witnesses Unit may advise the Prosecutor and the Court on appropriate
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reparations be made by an individual, but not by a state. 34 7 The court may also
order the state to seize proceeds, assets, and property of the convicted to make
reparations to victims. 
3 48
The drafters of the Rome Statute had concerns that indictments could
potentially sabotage peace negotiations if leaders refuse to disarm out of fear of
prosecution.3 49  To prevent indictments from becoming barriers to conflict
resolution, the Rome Statute allows the United Nations Security Council to
adopt a resolution that suspends the ICC investigation for one year. 350  A
majority of the Council's fifteen members must agree, including all five veto
powers: the United States, Russia, China, Britain, and France.351 The threat to
the peace process must be severe before the Security Council is likely to suspend
the LRA indictments.
352
If the ICC chooses to prosecute Kony and the LRA leadership, the court
will likely influence domestic criminal law in regards to genocide, war crimes,
protective measures, security arrangements, counselling and assistance as
referred to in article 43, paragraph 6.
See also Rome Statute, supra note 269, art. 68, paras. 3-4; see also Rome Statute, supra note 269,
art. 75, para. 3 (noting that "[blefore making an order under this article, the Court may invite and
shall take account of representations from or on behalf of the convicted person, victims, other
interested persons or interested States."); see also Rome Statute, supra note 269, art. 82, para. 4
(stating that "[a] legal representative of the victims, the convicted person or a bona fide owner of
property adversely affected by an order under article 75 may appeal against the order for
reparations, as provided in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.").
347. SCHABAS, supra note 330, at 174; Rome Statute, supra note 269, art. 75, para. 2 (stating
"[t]he Court may make an order directly against a convicted person specifying appropriate
reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation.").
348. SCHABAS, supra note 330, at 174; Rome Statute, supra note 269, art. 77, para. 2 (noting that
"[i]n addition to imprisonment, the Court may order... [a] forfeiture of proceeds, property and
assets derived directly or indirectly from that crime, without prejudice to the rights of bona fide
third parties.").
349. James D. Kole, Lessons of Peace Through Justice, 152 CHI. DAILY L. BULL. 6, Nov. 1,
2006.
350. Id.; Rome Statute, supra note 269, art. 16 (noting that "[n]o investigation or prosecution
may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute for a period of 12 months after the
Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the same
conditions.").
351. Kole, supra note 349; U.N. Charter art. 27, para. 3, available at
http://www.un.org/aboutunlcharter (last visited Apr. 8, 2007) (stating that "[d]ecisions of the
Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members
including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under
Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.").
352. Kole, supra note 349.
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and crimes against humanity. 353 This authority may come about as the court
determines what it construes as adequate measures in these cases and takes
jurisdiction when a state party is unwilling or unable to meet the standard. 354 If
the ICC chooses to recognize Uganda's Amnesty program as adequate, the court
may face criticism from those who value retributive justice. 355 Some believe the
ICC should bring criminals like Kony to justice because to do otherwise would
"excuse the most egregious deeds, betray the victims who endured them, and
.... ,,356
encourage similar crimes against others. While others follow a philosophy
of moral imperative; criminals should be punished because they deserve it.
357
Human rights groups tend to see amnesty as "impunity," and advocate for
.. 358
prosecution. Forgoing prosecution can give the impression that certain people
are above the law.
359
V. UGANDA'S OBLIGATION TO THE ICC UNDER THE ROME STATUTE
The drafters of the Rome Statute could not agree on any single amnesty
policy so they left the authority to the ICC to develop its own jurisprudence on
the matter over time. 36  The ICC has not yet interpreted the Rome Statute on• • 361
this point, so no policy has been established. Early decisions of the ICC may
influence policy for years to come.362  The difficulty lies in balancing the
interests in peace negotiation with the need for justice.
The Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Convention encourages broad
granting of amnesty at the end of armed conflicts. 364 However, the International
353. Blumenson, supra note 279, at 805.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 819.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Dwight G. Newman, The Rome Statute, Some Reservations Concerning Amnesties, and a
Distributive Problem, 20 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 293, 295 (2005).
359. S. Sandile Ngcobo, Truth, Justice, and Amnesty in South Africa: Sins from the Past and
Lessons for the Future, 8 Ius GENTIUM 1, 5 (2002), available at
http://law.ubalt.edu/cicl/ilt/IU8-1-2002.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2007).
360. Id. at 803-04.
361. Newman, supra note 358, at 296-97.
362. Id. at 343.
363. Blumenson, supra note 279, at 801.
364. Newman, supra note 358, at 313; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949 art. 6, para.5, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, available at
http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/pdf/protocol2.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2007) (stating that "[alt
the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall endeavour to grant the broadest possible
amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed conflict, or those deprived of their liberty
for reasons related to the armed conflict, whether they are interned or detained.").
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Committee of the Red Cross has limited the scope of amnesties to exclude
international humanitarian law.365 Insurgents will not often negotiate surrender
without immunity of some sort.3 6 6  Amnesties are regularly part of peace
negotiations, used as a bargaining chip or incentive for abusers with power to
relinquish that power.367 Indeed, Kony and the other LRA leaders indicted by
the ICC have repeatedly insisted that those indictments be dropped before they
will come out of the bush. 368  Nonetheless, the ICC has held its ground in
keeping the indictments in force. 369 Article 53 of the Rome Statute allows the
prosecutor to abandon investigation or prosecution if doing so is not in the
interests of justice. 37  Of course, the ambiguity lies in determining what,,371. 372
constitutes "justice.' 371 Justice needs not always be prosecution. Argentina,
365. BRUCE BROOMHALL, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
BETWEEN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RULE OF LAW 96-97 (2003).
366. Blumenson, supra note 279, at 803.
367. Newman, supra note 358, at 342.
368. Milton Olupot, Kony Still in Hideout, NEW VISION (Uganda), Sept. 18, 2006, available at
http://www.newvision.co.ug/PA/8/12/521899; see also Stephen, supra note 307; see also
Muhumuza, supra note 67; see also Muhumuza, Talks in Trouble as LRA Makes U-Turn, supra
note 134.
369. Chris Ocowun, Kony Indictment at ICC Stands, Says President, NEW VISION, Sept. 20,
2006; see also Frank Nyakairu & Grace Matsiko, Museveni, Juba Team Meet Over Kony Arrest,
DAILY MONITOR (Uganda), Sept. 18, 2006; see also Muhumuza, supra note 10.
370. Blumenson, supra note 279, at 813; Rome Statute, supra note 269, art. 53, para. 3.
371. Blumenson, supra note 279, at 813.
372. Newman, supra note 358, at 296-306. Newman also notes:
[i]ntemational prosecutions may not be able to produce more substantial
numbers, and international prosecutions, as national prosecutions, could
interfere with a path toward a democratic transition. Thus, the most favourable
interpretations of amnesties view amnesties as modalities to avoid future
human rights abuses that may enable a potentially new and dynamic path as
well as serve a restorative function in the context of complex societal
situations.
Id. at 306. Another scholar has observed that criminal punishment is not always the answer.
[t]his obligation to do justice is not identical to, and does not always entail, a
simple duty to prosecute and punish. In the aftermath of a crime, the essential
duty of a state.., is to recognize and repudiate the crime, and stand in
solidarity with the victim. Criminal punishment is ordinarily an effective
means of achieving this, but sometimes other instruments may be as well.
See Blumenson, supra note 279, at 834.
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Chile, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and South Africa have created truth
commissions that provide non-penal accountability in lieu of prosecution.
373
In South Africa, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission ("TRC")
provided the process needed for the country to transition to a democratic
government from the apartheid regime.374  In gross human rights violations
cases, there may be too many violations to prosecute traditionally.37 5 In South
Africa, 21,000 apartheid victims came forward to report violations. 376 Also,
victims had often been killed, leaving only the offender to know what
happened. 377  In a retributive justice system, information about the victims
would not be forthcoming.378 Additionally, no negotiation settlement would
have been possible had the apartheid leaders feared prosecution.
379
Amnesty alone seemed unjust, so the South Africans coupled amnesty with
accountability. 3 8  In order to get amnesty, offenders had to come forward and
fully disclose what they had done.38 1 Those who did not come forward and
publicly confess were still subject to prosecution. 382 With public confessions,
the apartheid government could no longer deny the crimes occured.383 Truth
commissions are effective in recording a credible history and dispelling false
denials in several countries. 384 Seventy percent of the black victims of apartheid
supported amnesty in exchange for truth. 385 Seven thousand people avelied for
amnesty in South Africa, and one in seven applications was rejected. Those
allowed to confess faced public hearings where victims and their families could
.. 387
ask the applicant questions. Disgrace became the method of accountability
• .388
with those responsible suffering condemnation in their communities. The
scope of the TRC was much greater than traditional investigations and
373. Ngcobo, supra note 359, at 2; Blumenson, supra note 279, at 814.
374. Ngcobo, supra note 359, at 4.
375. Id. at 6.
376. Id.
377. Id. at 7.
378. Id.
379. Id. at 10.
380. Ngcobo, supra note 359, at 13.
381. Id.
382. Id. at 36.
383. Blumenson, supra note 279, at 865.
384. Richard J. Goldstone, Peace Versus Justice, 6 NEv. L.J. 421, 422 (2005).
385. Blumenson, supra note 279, at 861.
386. Id. at 863.
387. Id.
388. Id. at 868-69.
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prosecutions and provided the victims with greater respect and reaffirmation than
available with a trial.
389
A. Has Uganda Made a Promise It Cannot Keep?
1. Uganda's Obligation as a Member of the ICC
Uganda must undertake some method of justice to satisfy its obligation as a
signatory to the ICC.390 Given the success of the TRC in South Africa,39 1 it may
be reasonable to assume that the ICC would consider a similar amnesty for truth
program as an adequate justice. However, unlike the TRC, Uganda's Amnesty
program does not have a restorative justice mechanism,39 2 in which victims
could participate in the process of repairing the harm. 39 3 Currently, amnesty is
granted in exchange for surrender of the applicant. 394  Uganda's traditional
reconciliation ceremony of "mato oput" is not part of the formal legal system,
395
but could be made into law as a compromise to the ICC. 396 However, some
Ugandans have pointed out that "mato oput" cannot be forced on perpetrators as
it requires voluntary confession.397  Nonetheless, the ICC could interpret the
Rome Statute and see Uganda's efforts as genuinely carrying out investigation
and prosecution. 398  However, those efforts will fail if they are seen as
"'shielding people from criminal responsibility."' 399
Even if Uganda did adopt a truth commission similar to South Africa's
TRC, Uganda's situation is different in that the LRA leaders are not respected
members of the community. In South Africa, disgrace was not impunity,
because the people confessing were respected figures like doctors, scientists, and
389. Id. at 865, 868.
390. Rome Statute, supra note 269, art. 17.
391. Blumenson, supra note 279, at 822 (stating that "[h]ad there been no South African
amnesties, there might be no legitimate legal system in place today, given their centrality in
obtaining a peaceful transition from the apartheid system.").
392. Id. at 807; Rome Statute, supra note 269, art. 77.
393. See RestorativeJustice.org, Introduction, http://www.restorativejustice.org/intro (last visited
Apr. 8, 2007).
394. Blumenson, supra note 279, at 807.
395. A Better Way to Resolve Conflict, supra note 246 (noting that "'[p]arliament must enact a
law that would transform the cultural ritual of mato oput to be adapted for reconciliation
nationally, to transform the Acholi culture, to be adopted by all Ugandans."').
396. Bloomfield, supra note 338.
397. A Better Way to Resolve Conflict, supra note 246 (stating that "'[o]ur methods of
reconciliation are now being distorted. The killer will always confess with all his heart without
being forced to. You don't force reconciliation. It is a belief."').
398. Declan Roche, Truth Commission Amnesties and the International Criminal Court, 45
BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 565, 568 (2005).
399. Id.
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law enforcement leaders, so their fall from grace amounted to accountability. 40 0
Nonetheless, some people in Uganda have advocated that Uganda create a truth
commission to strengthen the measures agreed upon at the Juba talks. 40 1 That
may or may not be enough to thwart accusations of impunity by the ICC.
The nations that are state parties to the ICC vary greatly as far as legal and
moral cultures are concerned.4 0 2  As such, the ICC may need to consider
allowing some diversity in state approaches to justice.4 03 It may be analogous to
the margin of appreciation 4 04 given by the European Court of Human Rights in
dealing with diverse nations.405 Further, a nation in nascent democracy is likely
to view justice differently than an established, stable nation. 406 Imperfect justice
may be an acceptable trade-off for peace.
40 7
a. In Breach of Obligation or Acting under Sovereignty?
The ICC may be reluctant to recognize Uganda's amnesty program.408
Sovereign states sometimes sacrifice the general interests of the international
community at large to promote their own immediate short-term interests.
40 9
Since crimes at the international scale affect humanity as a whole, the need to
400. Blumenson, supra note 279, at 869.
401. Kintu Nyago, We Need a Truth Commission, NEW VISION (Uganda), Sept. 23, 2006; see
also Exile an Option for Kony, supra note 27; see also Open Letter to LRA: Save the Peace
Process, DAILY MONITOR (Uganda), Oct. 31, 2006.
402. Blumenson, supra note 279, at 853.
403. Id.
404. See Eyal Benvenisti, Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal Standards, 31
N.Y.U. J. INT'l L. & POL. 843, 843 (1999) (explaining that the European Court of Human Rights
has developed the margin of appreciation doctrine in its jurisprudence. The doctrine is principled
in moral and cultural relativism, such that each society is given some latitude in creating and
implementing law. The doctrine is often criticized for being at odds with the concept of
universally applicable standards of law. In short, a violation in one country would not be a
violation in another, due to the moral and cultural differences of the countries.). The European
Commission on Human Rights has stated:
[t]he possible existence of alternative solutions does not in itself render the
contested legislation unjustified. Provided that the legislature remains within
the bounds of its margin of appreciation, it is not for the Court to say whether
the legislation represented the best solution for dealing with the problem or
whether the legislative discretion should have been exercised in another way.
Mellacher & Others v. Austria, App. No. 10522/83, Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 1, 28 (1989).
405. Blumenson, supra note 279, at 853.
406. Ngcobo, supra note 359, at 29.
407. Id. at 29.
408. Newman, supra note 358, at 344.
409. Id.
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dispense justice would outweigh the need to honor state sovereignty. 4 1  Thus,
amnesties would only be allowed if they promoted the general public good.4 11 if
the ICC does not permit Uganda's amnesty program, then Uganda is violating its
obligation under international law.412 If the ICC construes amnesty for the rebel
leaders as "unwillingness" to prosecute, the ICC may step in and prosecute on its
413
own.
The gravity of the crimes charged against Kony and Uganda's membership
in the ICC may be construed as imposing a duty for Uganda to prosecute.4 14 The
sixth paragraph of the Rome Statute preamble reads, "[lrecalling that it is the
duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for
international crimes... ,,415 However, if such duty exists, a conditional
amnesty may be acceptable in light of that duty, whereas a blanket amnesty
would not.416 Further, national laws under state sovereignty may be inadequate
to effectively handle the scope and magnitude of the crimes, thus making the
case admissible to the ICC's jurisdiction.417
Regardless of the ICC's view of Uganda and the situation, Ugandan tribal
and religious leaders see the situation as a wholly local problem. 4 18 Bishop
Benjamin Ojwang in Kitgum stated,
[t]here is this international justice which you people in the West are so
keen to see brought to bear on people like Kony. But Kony is not
Western, this war is not yours. It is our problem and we must solve it
our way, by meeting, talking, reconciling and forgiving.419
410. Id.
411. Id. at 348-49 (stating that "[tihe international community has an interest not only in the
application of human rights but in the restoration and maintenance of public order and the ways in
which aggregate human rights may be enhanced.").
412. BROOMHALL, supra note 365, at 96.
413. Newman, supra note 358, at 327-28. Article 17 of the Rome Statute allows the ICC to
prosecute in some circumstances:
Having regard to paragraph 10 of the Preamble and article 1, the Court shall
determine that a case is inadmissible where... The case is being investigated
or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is
unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution ....
Rome Statute, supra note 269, art. 17
414. BROOMHALL, supra note 365, at 97-98.
415. Rome Statute, supra note 269, at Preamble.
416. BROOMHALL, supra note 365, at 98.
417. Id. at84.
418. See Pflanz, supra note 65.
419. Id.
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Collins Opoka, an Acholi chief, added, "In our culture, we don't like to
punish people .... It doesn't really get you anywhere."
420
However, even if the ICC does not pursue its indictments, and Uganda
grants amnesty to Kony and the rebel leaders, they may still face prosecution in a
foreign jurisdiction that claims a right to prosecute domestically for genocide,
war crimes, and crimes against humanity. 42 1 Any time Kony and his rebel
leaders travel, they may risk being arrested and indicted by a country that has
enacted anti-impunity laws. 422  Chile's former dictator, General Augusto
Pinochet, experienced such fate when he traveled to England, was arrested by the
British government, and subsequently indicted by the Spanish government. In
short, Uganda cannot guarantee protection from prosecuting Kony and his rebel
leaders, even if Uganda satisfies the ICC and the indictments are dropped.
424
2. Uganda's Obligation to the World Community
Just like any sovereign nation, Uganda has an implied obligation to the
World Community to forward the interests of justice for humanity as a whole.425
With this in mind, the next section explores the long-term sustainability of peace
and victims' satisfaction under an amnesty program.
a. Is Peace Sustainable under Negotiated Forgiveness?
Human Rights Watch, the New York based human rights grou?, has been
critical of Uganda's amnesty offer to Kony and the LRA leaders.426 Richard
Dicker, the director of the group's International Justice Program, commented on
the importance of not seeing "justice and peace as mutually antagonistic
opposites."'42 7 He also stated that amnesty for Kony and the LRA leaders would
not give a "meaningful and durable peace" in Uganda given the gravity of the
LRA's crimes.
4 28
420. Gettleman, supra note 46.
421. Vukoni Lupa Lasaga, Editorial, Folly of Macho Flight Into Juba, DAILY MONITOR
(Uganda), Oct. 24, 2006.
422. Id.
423. Id.
424. Id.
425. Rome Statute, supra note 269, Preamble ("Affirming that the most serious crimes of
concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective
prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing
international cooperation.").
426. Oziewicz, supra note 144.
427. Id.
428. Id.
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However, Jennifer Widner, a professor at Princeton University, conducted a
survey of 200 constitutional reforms since 1975 and concluded that "amnesty
was strongly associated with the durability of civil peace."'429 Amnesty has been
the most widely used instrument for dealing with violence in negotiating peace
treaties since 1980, and formal amnesties have brought about the end of two-
thirds of the wars since 1989.430 Amnesties must be carefully crafted to create
the right incentives to attract the perpetrators, but also the right constraints to
leave them fragile yet secure and acquiescent to peaceful political change.
431
As an alternative to amnesty, Dr. Hillel Levine, the president and founder of
the International Institute for Mediation and Historical Conciliation, suggested
exile for Joseph Kony and the other LRA leaders. 432 Dr. Levine was advising a
seven member delegation from Northern Uganda headed by David Onen-Acan
II, the Acholi Paramount Chief.433 Concerns over victims seeking revenge could• • •,, ,,434
drive Kony and the others into exile, even after the "mato oput" ceremony. In
2002, Uganda, Libya, Egypt and Sudan discussed a proposal that Kony be exiled
if caught by the Ugandan army in Sudan.435 Kony has said that he would feel
safer in another country than in his home village of Odek in Gulu.4 36 He listed
the United States, the Central African Republic, Nairobi, Europe, Sudan, or any
other Arab country as his preferred places to live.
437
b. Is Forgiveness Equivalent to Justice from the Victims' Perspective?
Many victims attending the TRC public hearings in South Africa were
appalled to hear serial murders claim their war as just.438  Apologies and
forgiveness are meaningless when coerced.439 Also, only a limited number of
victims could be accommodated at the public hearings, leaving the rest440SotAfiasTCbled
disappointed and frustrated with the experience. South Africa's TRC believed
that the general cathartic experience would heal the nation as a whole, posting
429. Snyder, supra note 309.
430. Id.
431. Id.
432. Exile an Option for Kony, supra note 27.
433. Id.
434. Id.
435. Id.
436. Id.
437. Id.
438. Roche, supra note 398, at 576.
439. Id.
440. Id. at 577.
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banners that read 'Revealing is Healing.' 441 However, the truth commissions
could not heal victims' harms, especially with forced forgiveness.
44 2
'Forgiveness is a power held by the victimized, not a right to be
claimed. The ability to dispense, but also to withhold, forgiveness is an
ennobling capacity and part of the dignity to be reclaimed by those who
survive the wrongdoing. Even an individual survivor who chooses to
forgive cannot, properly, forgive in the name of other victims. To
expect survivors to forgive is to heap yet another burden on them.'
443
Victims of apartheid are still in the process of healing. 444 Forgiveness on a
grand scale has not yet occurred; the wounds are deep. 5 It is naYve to think
reconciliation can happen overnight."
6
But many Ugandans are ready to try forgiveness. Susan Ejang was
abducted from her school as a child, witnessing her classmates' deaths, She
was forced to fight for the LRA for eight years, after which she escaped and
returned home. 44 8 Despite all that she endured, Ejang is still hopeful about the
peace process in Uganda.449 She is not alone. Herron Okello, a leader at an IDP
camp, has said that the LRA should return home, in spite of their brutality.
450
For eleven-year-old Kenneth Kidega, born and raised in an IDP camp,
forgiveness is the best hope for peace. 451 He said that an end to the war would
bring a better life than he has ever known.
452
However, not everyone who has been brutalized by the LRA is ready to
forgive.453 Consolata Auma has not forgotten that the LRA cut off her lips,
nose, and ears because she was caught walking on the road.454 Christine Acora
was set on fire when she did not have money to give rebels who came to her
441. Id. at 578.
442. Id.
443. Id. at 579 (quoting MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS; FACING
HISTORY AFrER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 17 (1998)).
444. Ngcobo, supra note 359, at 26.
445. Id.
446. Id.
447. Among, supra note 97.
448. Id.
449. Id.
450. Balancing Forgiveness with Justice, supra note 97.
451. Id.
452. Id.
453. Id.
454. Id.
[Vol. 14:2
PEACE OR JUSTICE
house.455 For these women and others like them, forgiveness is not justice, and
they want to see the rebels pay.456 However, this view seems to be in the
minority in Northern Uganda, where people are weary of violence and see
forgiveness as the only road to peace.457
Ugandans seem conflicted about what exactly they want.4 58  The
International Center for Transnational Justice ("ICTJ") conducted a poll last year
and discovered that seventy-six percent of Ugandans want the LRA to be held
accountable, while simultaneously sixty-five percent support amnesty for the
LRA. 459 The result seems incongruent, unless there is some way that amnesty
can also hold the rebels accountable. The poll's results about the fate of top
leaders are more logical: sixty-six percent of Ugandans want the top leadership
punished, while twenty-two percent want forgiveness. 46  Thus, the poll results
indicate that Ugandan views on achieving peace are conflicted.
461
Meanwhile, many people within Uganda are ready to forgive to gain peace
in the area.462 James Otto, director of Human Rights Focus in the northern town
of Gulu, said that Uganda does not have the capacity to have peace and justice at
the same time.463 He stated, "[w]e need one at a time, and the priority for the
community is peace."'464 Thirty percent of the people stated that "peace could be
achieved through dialogue," twenty-six percent believed amnesty, forgiveness,
and reconciliation would bring peace, fourteen percent believed military means
were necessary, and five percent thought peace could be brought through
justice. 465 From the Ugandan point of view, peace may be tantamount to justice.
455. Id.
456. Balancing Forgiveness with Justice, supra note 97.
457. Id.
458. McLaughlin, supra note 33.
459. Id.
460. Id.
461. See id.
462. England, supra note 8.
463. Id.
464. Id.
465. McLaughlin, supra note 33.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Amnesty seems like a good solution, given that it honors the wishes of the
Ugandan people, 46 6 who are the ultimate victims of the conflict. Allowing
"mato oput" gives recognition to traditional justice as a valid method for conflict467 ...
resolution and gives Uganda the autonomy it seeks in handling its own affairs
since the end of colonialism. 468 However, amnesty also gives the impression
that some people are above the law469 and may promote deal brokering among
other perpetrators of horrible crimes. 470
ICC prosecution also seems favorable because the general world contention
is that justice is served through criminal trial and punishment.471 The successful
prosecution of the LRA leadership would establish important precedent for
handling similar cases in the future472 and would create legitimacy for the
ICC. 47 3 However, the ICC is dependant on member states to enforce its rules
and must work with those states to meet its goals. 474 The court cannot afford to
have its members refuse to cooperate.
475
The question then becomes, which viewpoint wins at the end of the day?
The Western world supports prosecution and holds money, power, and
influence-remember that half of Uganda's budget comes from foreign aid.
476
As much as Uganda may want to handle its own affairs, it invited Western
interference. Uganda has in fact greatly benefited from that invitation since, for
the first time in a quarter century, it stands close to peace. However, the stakes
are not high for Uganda alone. The ICC stands to lose the credibility it has
gained thus far in the international community.477 The Court simply can neither
afford to drop the indictments against Kony and the LRA leadership, nor can it
afford to have Uganda, its first patron, refuse to cooperate. 478 Although the ICC
is powerless to force compliance, it must stand its ground to maintain legitimacy
466. Id.
467. See A Better Way to Resolve Conflict, supra note 246; McConnell, supra note 9.
468. DAVIDSON, supra note 40, at 176.
469. Ngcobo, supra note 359, at 5.
470. See Stephen, supra note 307.
471. See Smyth, supra note 19; see generally Redfern, supra note 19; Allio, supra note 316.
472. Blumenson, supra note 279, at 805.
473. See generally Akhavan, supra note 12, at 419.
474. LEONARD, supra note 268, at 61; SCHABAS, supra note 330, at 169.
475. LEONARD, supra note 268, at 61.
476. See Coming in from the Jungle, Maybe, supra note 11.
477. Akhavan, supra note 12, at 405.
478. Id. at 419.
[Vol. 14:2
PEACE OR JUSTICE
in the eyes of the Western world.479 Neither Uganda nor the ICC can afford to
disappoint the world that is watching and waiting.
479. See generally Akhavan, supra note 12, at 419.
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